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Abstract 
Average hourly productivity has often been used to draw conclusions on 
long run per capita GDP growth, based on the assumption of full utilization 
of labour resources. In this paper, we argue that a failure to recognize the 
potentially significant wedges among the two variables – even in the long 
run - can be misleading. By applying both time series and panel 
cointegration techniques on data on 19 OECD countries, we fail to reject 
the hypothesis of absence of a long run common stochastic trend among the 
two variables in the period 1980-2005. Furthermore, we apply a simple 
decomposition of GDP growth into five variables, included some related to 
the supply-side and demographics, so to verify the single contributions to 
income growth and variance over our period of interest. We conclude that 
variables that have been so far absent in the growth literature have indeed a 
non-negligible role in explaining the dynamics of long run per capita GDP 
growth. In particular, these “forgotten factors” (that we identify with the 
employment and the activity rates and a demographic ratio) matter more in 
better performing economies, where we also highlight that productivity has 
been less important in determining GDP growth than in relatively bad 
performers. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Can we legitimately use average productivity as a proxy for long-run GDP growth? Growth theory and 
empirical applications have widely used the two variables interchangeably. In this paper we perform an 
empirical checking of this practice, using annual data from 1980 to 2005 for a sample of 19 OECD 
countries. We employ a double-step methodology: first we perform a cointegration analysis - both at 
time series and at panel levels - in order to check the long run properties of the two variables and verify 
the existence of a common stochastic trend. Subsequently, as supporting evidence, we carry out a 
simple and straightforward quantitative exercise: we decompose per capita GDP growth into five 
variables, including some supply side and demographic factors, so to be able to identify and quantify 
the ex-post contribution of each of them to per capita income growth. 
Figure 1 shows the values of real capita GDP and hourly productivity growth rates for the economies 
under investigation over the period 1980-2005.  
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
Clearly, there are pronounced similarities between the two series, yet there is no perfect matching. The 
aim of this paper is to look deeper into the wedge between the two variables highlighted by Figure1.  
Our findings suggest that those (supply side and demographic) factors usually thought of as irrelevant 
for long-run GDP growth might actually play a more significant role than it is often assumed. Our tests 
fail to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration between hourly productivity and real per capita 
GDP in our data set, confirming that the role of demographic and labour supply factors cannot be 
treated as simple statistical noise over the long run. Particularly, we find that in better-performing 
economies the relative weight of other-than-productivity factors on GDP growth is higher than in 
countries that experienced lower growth rates. This is confirmed by the cointegration tests run at the 
time series level, which confirm the absence of a common long-run stochastic trend between GDP and 
productivity in better performing economies, while rejecting the null in most of the economies whose 
25 years GDP growth is below the median. These results might therefore trigger a renewed interest in 
the determinants of long-run growth and in the growth-enhancing policies. 
The reason why the factors we focus on are usually neglected, and various measures of aggregate 
labour productivity have traditionally been identified as the unique approximations of long run per 
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capita income, has anyway deep roots in economic analysis.
1
 In the Solow (1956) model, the 
diminishing returns hypothesis renders long-run output growth depending exclusively on technological 
progress, empirically measured by the so-called Solow residual. The empirical validity of this theory 
has been subsequently checked in a variety of growth accounting exercises. Young (1995) seems to 
downplay the role of pure technological progress in the rapid growth of newly industrialized East Asian 
countries in the Nineties, finding that the “growth miracle” of those years was almost entirely due to 
increasing labour force participation and improved labour quality. On the other hand, Hsieh (2002), 
examining the same episodes, finds a larger role for technological progress by considering factor 
returns instead of quantities in growth accounting. Similar exercises have been performed for the 
analysis of US exceptional growth rates in the mid-Nineties (Oliner and Sichel 2000, Jorgenson and 
Stiroh 2000, Whelan 2000), but were mainly targeted to the identification of which part of 
technological progress played the largest role in enhancing growth.   
However, the ultimate factor allowing the indistinct use of per-capita GDP and productivity growth 
rates is the full employment assumption
2
; switching from theory to the real world, this amounts to 
assuming that employed, labour force, active population and total population coincide. Alternatively, 
given the focus on growth rates rather than levels, it means that they are assumed to be constant over 
time. Our contribution aims at challenging this assumption from an empirical point of view, using 
annual data for 19 OECD countries from 1980 to 2005; although these supply-side variables do show 
less volatility over time, we argue that they still can play a non-negligible role in explaining long run 
growth, and therefore should not be completely forgotten in favour of an exclusive focus on average 
productivity.   
While we are certainly far from believing that our analysis exhausts the investigation on long run per 
capita GDP growth determinants, we still maintain that a more accurate growth accounting can benefit 
from this methodology. Our results call for a more complete and structural analysis capable of 
accounting for the interactions and the determinants of the factors under consideration, we believe that 
they can per se constitute a meaningful contribution to a better understanding and identification of 
policies aimed at increasing long-run GDP growth. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the main idea of the paper, 
applying our proposed GDP growth decomposition so to highlight the role of the “forgotten factors”. 
                                                 
1
 Temple (1999, 142), in an article about growth, states that “it is clear that in-depth studies are needed to address the links 
between population growth and macroeconomic outcomes.” Our paper is an attempt to take this suggestion to the data. 
2
 The exogenous growth models allow an increase in labour force to be a growth-enhancing measure but fail to further 
disentangle the demographic contribution. 
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Section 3 analyses the long-run relationship between per capita GDP and hourly productivity in the 
search for a common stochastic trend using both panel and time series cointegration techniques. 
Section 4 expands on these results by analyzing each variable of our proposed decomposition. Section 
5 concludes. 
 
2. GDP decomposition: the forgotten factors 
 
The main idea of our paper is captured by the decomposition of per-capita income 
Y
N  at time t into 
the components of the following identity: 
 
                               * * * *
t t t t t t
Y Y h L LF TAP
N h L LF TAP N
           
           
           
                     (1) 
 
where: 
Y = GDP 
N = total population 
h = total hours worked 
L = number of employees  
LF = labour force (employed and unemployed) 
TAP = total active population (aged between 15 and 64) 
 
In other words, equation (1) states that we can decompose the level of per-capita income into the 
product of five variables: hourly productivity 
Y
h , hours worked per employee 
h
L , employment 
rate 
L
LF , activity rate  LFTAP , and a demographic ratio 
TAP
N
. .  
To the best of our knowledge, a similar decomposition has mainly been used in two specifications.  
 Piacentini and Sulis (2000) limit their analysis to a two-terms decomposition: 
                                                                *
Y Y L
N L N
                                                              (2) 
so to focus their attention on average productivity and a wide measure of employment (employed over 
total population), which does not allow to fully capture the role of demographic factors. With respect to 
their analysis, we carry out a more detailed exercise along two dimensions: first, we consider hourly 
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productivity rather than average, so to take into account the role of the hours worked. Second, we 
further decompose the employment measure into the product of three ratios (“proper” employment rate, 
activity rate and the demographic ratio), in order to emphasize meaningful issues related to the labour 
supply and the demographic structure. On the other hand, looking into the reasons behind the decline in 
hours worked across the Atlantic, Blanchard (2004) uses a decomposition very similar to (1). Our paper 
departs from his work along two lines: first, we apply the full decomposition to a wider set of countries 
up to 2005 data; secondly, we investigate the issue in a more systematic way, in a framework where the 
resulting evidence is fortified by econometric evidence.  
Note that this decomposition has the advantage of dispensing us with the need of assuming a specific 
functional form for the production function (and, consequently, the calibration of the related technical 
parameters) and the task of choosing an adequate measure of the capital/labour ratio. Equation (2) in 
fact – which we further decompose according to (1) – can be seen as the Cobb-Douglas production 
function divided by total population N. 
  
                                                            
1Y AK L L K
A
N N N L
 
 
   
 
                                                      (3) 
which is, after considering capital per worker, exactly equation (2). Alternatively, our decomposition is 
also equivalent to the one used for instance by Hayashi and Prescott (2004): 
                                                                
1
1
1
Y K h L
A
N Y L N




    
 
                                                           (4) 
with the following production function: 
                                                                    
1
h
Y AK L
L



 
  
 
                                                               (5) 
where N is total population, h/L is hours worked per employee, and L is aggregate employment. 
Equation (4) has extensively been used in classic cross-section growth accounting exercises; as our 
focus is not the investigation of the Solow residual, A, but rather the role of demographic factors on 
long-run per capita growth, we stick to equation (1), which has also the remarkable advantage of not 
having to rely on variables or parameters that can be hard to measure/estimate exactly.
3
 
Each of the factors in (1) yields different pieces of information about the structure of the economy and 
the scope of policy intervention. Hourly productivity is informative about the efficiency level of the 
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employed resources, depending on the capital/labour ratio in the short run, and a variety of factors in 
the long run - commonly regrouped under the definition “total factor productivity” - such as 
technology, public and social infrastructure, human capital and knowledge accumulation, social capital, 
property rights protection, political stability, research and development. Average hours worked provide 
information on households' labour supply. The employment rate indicates the economy's capability to 
generate a level of aggregate demand such that a given number of individuals can actually have a job; 
in this regard, an important role is played by labour market features such as centralization of industrial 
relations, flexibility, trade unions strength and regulation. The activity rate tells us how many persons 
out of the total active population are willing to supply labour services on the legal job market. This 
measure is likely to be affected by many relevant factors: the labour tax burden and the level of 
children care services (which may discourage the supply of labour in families where one component is 
already part of the work force), the presence of long-term unemployment (which takes discouraged 
people out of the work force), the presence of a black market, and even some residual cultural factors 
which tend to privilege domestic work. Finally, the demographic ratio can be affected by policy 
considerations if we think about immigration regulatory regimes, an issue that is much debated in these 
years in developed countries, or fertility and birth incentive issues.  
Standard growth models assume: 
 
  
L LF TAP
k
LF TAP N
     
       
     
 ,   0,1k            (6) 
 
This is the reason why the terms “output per worker” and “output per capita” can be used as syonyms 
when utilizing constant returns to scale aggregate production functions. Thanks to our decomposition, 
see equation (1),we can make the following remarks. 
The emphasis on productivity growth as ultimate determinant of long-run growth is still justified: no 
other increase in any of the components on the RHS of (1) is able to determine per se a rise in per-
capita income. In fact, proceeding from right to left, an increase in the numerator is also a decrease in 
the denominator of the term next to the left, thereby offsetting the positive effect. Thus, an increase in 
the effectiveness of labour supply (i.e. productivity) is the only necessary and sufficient condition for 
per-capita growth. Nevertheless, the relationship between productivity and per-capita output can be 
                                                                                                                                                                       
3
 For instance, Young (1995) noted that the estimation of TFP growth change once other factors (rising participation rates 
among the others) are taken into account.  
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"wedged" by the employment rate, the activity rate and the demographic ratio. That is, a sustained 
growth in productivity can result in a less than proportionate per-capita income growth according to the 
dynamics of the other factors in (1). 
To see this formally, let us turn to growth rates, leading (1) one period forward, taking logs and then 
subtracting the values of the preceding period, so to obtain: 
 
1 1 1 1
1 1
log log log log log log log log
log log log log
t t t t t t t t
t t t
Y Y Y Y h h L L
N N h h L L LF LF
LF LF TAP TAP
TAP TAP N N
   
 
                    
                           
                    
       
          
        t
 
 
 
                                                         
             (7) 
The economic interpretation of equation (7) is straightforward: per-capita GDP growth can be seen as 
the algebraic sum of growth in hourly productivity, in the intensive and the extensive margins, in the 
activity ratio and in active population. This relation does not allow any full counterfactual reasoning, as 
the partial derivative with respect to h, L, LF, TAP is zero and nothing can be said without a theory 
accounting for the determinants of each of the above ratios; however, it is informative about how much 
of productivity growth is “eaten up” by growth in other factors and about the magnitude of each 
contribution to per capita income growth.  
Before applying equation (7) to our dataset, in the following section we check the existence of 
cointegration between GDP and hourly productivity. We do so because, if the indistinct use of per 
capita GDP and hourly productivity is to be justified, we should at least be able to detect the presence 
of a common stochastic trend in the data over the long run. 
 
3. Data and cointegration analysis 
 
The main source of our data is the World Development Indicators produced by the World Bank. In 
particular, we use purchasing power parity GDP expressed in US dollars and we calculate the various 
ratios of equation (1) with the following series: the age dependency ratio (dependents to working-age 
population), labour force (total), population (total, ages 0-14, 15-64, 65 and above) and unemployment 
(total, percentage of labour force). We integrate these series with the OECD average annual hours 
actually worked per worker, available from the OECD Labour Database. 
Using this dataset, we look for a cointegrating relationship among per capita GDP and hourly 
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productivity. The use of cointegration tests to verify a steady long run relationship between any two 
economic variable is common in the empirical literature: it has been used when investigating the link 
between consumption spending and disposable income (Davidson et al 1978), public debt and GDP 
(Kremers 1989) and actual holding of the purchasing power parity condition. (Baillie and Selover 1987, 
Corbae and Ouliaris 1988). Here, we first run the test over the whole sample using panel cointegration 
techniques (subsection 3.1); then we do the same for each time series at the national level, to verify 
whether the existence of a common trend can be found in a specific sub-sample of countries featured 
by the same performances (subsection 3.2). 
 
3.1. Panel cointegration tests 
 
Our first step is to apply panel unit root test to check the order of integration of the two series. In order 
to ensure the robustness of the results, we carry out three different tests: the first two were proposed – 
respectively - by Levin et al. (2002) (LLC) and Hadri (2000) (H) and test the existence of a common 
root in the panel; the third one was built by Im et al. (2003) (IPS), and allows the existence of 
heterogeneous individual roots. All tests are carried out in two different model specifications: one 
assuming an individual intercept and the other with an individual intercept and a time trend. Results are 
reported in Table 1: 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
Looking at the LLC and the IPS tests, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity at 
conventional significance levels for both Y/N and Y/H (in three of the four different specifications). 
The Hadri test seems to over-reject the null hypothesis of stationarity (especially in the case of Y/H). 
However, due to the results of the other tests, it can be concluded that the two variables of interest 
appear to be integrated of order 1 in our dataset (this is also confirmed by the results of the tests for the 
first differences of the two series). Among the variables that appear to be integrated of the same order, 
it is necessary to look for a cointegrating relationship. We accomplish this task by implementing the 
methodology proposed by Pedroni (1999). Table 2 reports the relevant statistics: 
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
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The first three rows report within-dimension-based tests (panel v, panel   and the non-parametric panel 
PP test), while the last two lines show parametric between-dimension-based statistics (group   and 
group t ), which are just the group mean approach extensions of the within-based ones. The group   
test is particularly important, as it has been proven to have the best power among the Pedroni statistics 
(Gutierrez, 2003). Finally, we choose to use the non-weighted statistics – instead of weighted – because 
of their better performances in small samples. Most tests point to the non-rejection of the null 
hypothesis in a pretty robust fashion: only the panel v statistics, in the specification with an individual 
intercept, indicate the presence of a cointegrating relationship. Thus, we conclude that there is no 
evidence of a cointegrating relationship between the two variables of interest.   
 
3.2 Time series cointegration tests 
 
While the previous subsection confirms the absence of a well-defined cointegrating relationship at 
panel level, in this subsection we perform the same test on single countries’ time series by using the 
well-known Johansen cointegration test. Our objective is to verify whether the existence of a common 
stochastic trend between GDP and productivity – ruled out at the panel level – can indeed be found in 
any particular subset of countries. Table 3 reports the results country by country: 
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
Based on the above statistics, there is evidence in favour of the existence of a cointegrating relationship 
in 11 countries (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, 
Sweden, USA), whereas the tests indicate no cointegration in the remaining 8 (Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherland, Norway, Portugal, Spain, UK). In the next section we further investigate the panel and time 
series cointegration results. 
 
4. Exploring the “wedge”: GDP decomposition 
 
In section 3 we have established the absence of cointegration between per capita GDP and hourly 
productivity at panel level, while there is evidence of cointegration in a specific subset of countries. 
This result calls for further investigation. In this section we attempt to answer the following questions: 
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(i) if productivity and GDP do not share – in general – the same stochastic trend, what is the 
quantitative impact of the other factors creating the wedge between the two? (ii) if evidence of 
cointegration can be found in a given subset of countries, what is the common feature they share, and 
are the quantitative results of the GDP decomposition in line with that?  (iii) are the results on the 
relative importance of decomposing factor confirmed by the analysis of time series volatility?  
Subsection 4.1 is concerned with (i) and (ii), whereas subsection 4.2 looks at (iii). Finally, in subsection 
4.3 we verify the intensity of convergence of each variable. 
 
4.1. Growth rate decomposition   
 
In this subsection we investigate how much of the per-capita income growth in the period 1980-2005 is 
explained by growth in each factor of the RHS of equation (4).  
Table 4 reports the 25-year growth rates country-by-country: 
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
A visual inspection of Table 4 confirms that, while productivity dynamics is no doubt leading GDP 
growth, the two growth rates do not always match perfectly. As a general trend, we can notice that the 
decrease in hours worked is approximately offset by the increase in the activity ratio, whereas the 
increase in employment ratio and demography accounts for the positive differential between GDP and 
hourly productivity growth rates. In some cases, this differential is remarkable: in Japan and France a 
sharp decline in hours worked (almost 8%) made GDP grow substantially less than productivity; on the 
other hand, in Ireland (one of the most successful experiences) and Netherlands, active population and 
labour force growth are responsible for a noteworthy positive differential. 
Figure 2 orders countries growth rates over the period 1980-2005, helping us to individuate meaningful 
subsamples: 
 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
 
Median growth rate is 21.21% (Greece); we can thus distinguish between nine relatively good 
performers (high-growth countries: Korea, Ireland, Portugal, Norway, UK, Spain, Netherlands, 
Finland, USA) and nine relatively bad performers (low-growth countries: Japan, Australia, Belgium, 
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Denmark, Sweden, Canada, Italy, France, New Zealand).  Searching for interesting common patterns, a 
useful piece of information is provided, after having divided countries according to relative growth 
performances, by computing for each group a variable capturing the relative weight of each of the RHS 
component of equation (7) in determining the 25-year GDP growth: 
 
                                                           
/
i
i
Y N
g
m
g
                                                            (8) 
 
where i indicates each of the factor on the RHS of equation (1) and ig   the corresponding growth rate 
over the 1980-2005 time span. Table 5 shows the average values of this weight variable for countries 
above and below the median growth rate (“HIGH” and “LOW”) and for the total sample: 
 
Insert Table 5 about here 
 
We can observe that, while the negative role of hours worked is similar in the two groups, the relative 
weight of other components is different: in countries below the median growth rate, hourly productivity 
has grown even more than real per-capita income, with a less pronounced role for the remaining 
factors. In better-performing economies, on the other hand, the role played by growth in employment 
rate, activity rate and (to a lesser extent) active population ratio is non-negligible.   
This result can be combined with the statistical analysis of section 3. We found no evidence of time 
series cointegration in 8 countries, which correspond almost perfectly to the group of good performers 
(with the only exception of Italy). Conversely, we found evidence of cointegration in 11 countries, 
which can approximately
4
 be identified with the sub-sample of bad performers.  
Thus, it seems that economies which performed relatively good in the period 2005-1980 are 
characterized  by a non-negligible role of the “forgotten factors”: in those countries we do not find 
evidence of cointegration between GDP and productivity even at the time-series level, and the 
quantitative weight of the “wedge” (i.e. the “forgotten factors”) in our growth accounting exercise is 
large. On the other hand, in relatively bad performer economies, there is evidence of cointegration 
among hourly productivity and per capita GDP, and the forgotten factors seem to play a more 
negligible role. How do we interpret this result? Since our analysis is based on long-run dynamics, we 
                                                 
4
 8 countries out of 11 belong to the bad-performers group. 
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abstract from heterogeneity in short run aggregate demand policies across countries in the sample and 
focus on long-run supply-side determinants of income growth. Our double empirical evidence reveals a 
new growth theory stylized fact: within OECD area, a relatively higher trend in economic activity is 
not accounted for by a corresponding higher productivity growth trend; instead,  better performances in 
widening the overall participation into the labour market have played a significant role. The remarkable 
decrease in hours worked is a common feature; however, the most successful countries are not those 
who managed to counterbalance that decrease with higher productivity but, indeed, those who 
improved the utilization of labour input. Failing to do so results in lower income growth, regardless of 
the dynamics of hourly productivity. The example of France is particularly illuminating: one of the best 
performances in the sample in terms of productivity growth has not only been offset by a sharp 
decrease in hours worked (probably  emphasized by the reduction to thirty five working hours per week 
in 2000
5
), but also by a lack of increase in labour market participation. 
 
4.2. Variance decomposition  
 
We turn now to the examination of the variance of the series. The logarithmic version of equation (1) is 
a summation, thus we can decompose the variance of real per capita GDP as follows: 
 
                           
2 2 2 2 2 2
/ / / / / /Y N Y H H N N FL FL TAP TAP N tW                            (9) 
 
where the term Wt indicates the sum of the covariances: 
                                                                   2t ijW                             with i j                (10) 
 
In a five-terms equation like the one we use, the analysis of the covariances would be complicated and 
hard to interpret, so we limit ourselves to the decomposition of  2 /Y N  into the five direct effects, by 
building the following weight variable: 
                                                                  
2
2
/
i
i
Y N
q


                                                            (11) 
 
                                                 
5
 The reduction was then abolished in 2005. 
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where i indicates each of the factors on the RHS of (1).  
Table 6 reports GDP variance and the qi’s according to the growth-performance criterion: 
 
Insert Table 6 about here 
 
This result is harder to comment, for the above-mentioned reason: we can not tell the whole story since 
we chose not to take covariances into account (that is the reason why the qi’s do not sum up to 100%). 
However, there is also a bright side for that: by ignoring the cross-effects (which might be cumbersome 
to interpret economically), we can focus on the directly-interpretable percentage of GDP variance 
attributable to the variation in the underlying factors. Table 6 shows that – although in this case the 
differential in demographic factors’ quotas is negligible – the role played by hourly productivity is 
again lighter (i.e. lower than in the whole sample) in better-performing economies, whereas its variance 
is even higher than GDP variance in relatively bad performers. 
 
4.3. Convergence analysis    
 
A complementary and further piece of evidence supporting our findings can be given by verifying the 
convergence in the variables of our decomposition among the countries of our sample. The literature 
has reached a certain consensus on the fact that there has been convergence of economic growth among 
developed countries (Islam, 2003). The convergence is tested by running the following regression, 
based on the technique firstly used by Baumol (1986): 
 
                                                        2005 1980 1980X X X                                             (12) 
 
with the sign of coefficient   indicating convergence (if negative) or divergence (if positive) of the 
variable iX  which in each of the regressions take the form of one of the variables in equation (1). Table 
7 shows the results of the six different regressions:  
 
Insert Table 7 about here 
 
According to the previous literature, over the period 1980-2005, we observe convergence of GDP 
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growth among developed countries. Additionally, there is evidence of convergence for all the RHS 
variables of equation (1). A particular feature is noteworthy: the intensity of per capita income 
convergence (-0.394) is much higher than the corresponding value for hourly productivity convergence 
(-0.298). We interpret this result as a further confirmation of the role played by the remaining factors: 
the higher intensity of convergence in employment rate, activity rate and total active population helped 
to fill the gap between intensities in GDP and productivity convergence processes.  
 
5. Conclusions 
The assumption of full utilization of resources have so far made possible to use interchangeably real 
per capita GDP and (a measure of) average productivity. In this paper we implemented an empirical 
test of this assumption on a panel of 19 OECD countries using annual data for hourly productivity, 
hours worked per employee, employment and activity rates and active population over total population 
for the period 1980-2005. We first verified the long-run properties of GDP and productivity by 
performing a number of cointegration tests; then, we investigated more adequately the wedge between 
these two variables, by applying a GDP decomposition capable of disentangling income growth into 
five variables, included some supply side and demographic factors. We concluded that the indistinct 
use of GDP and productivity is not always fully justifiable, as we were not able to find cointegration at 
panel level and our GDP decomposition analysis indicates that the role of other factors is far from 
being negligible. Particularly, along both dimensions of analysis, we were able to distinguish two 
groups of countries characterized by different features. In better-performing economies we do not find 
evidence in favour of the existence of a cointegrating relationship, and we also find that the relative 
weight of productivity in explaining growth is lower than in countries with a worse 25 year growth rate, 
thus unveiling a non negligible role of the three supply side and demographic variables, that we 
labelled as the “forgotten factors”. Our finding suggests that these factors played a larger role than it is 
usually assigned to them both by standard theory and by the common understanding of long run income 
dynamics. Consequently, the stylized fact unveiled in this contribution suggests a twofold 
consideration. On the side of policy implications, while the emphasis on productivity-enhancing 
policies should obviously never been diminished, a sharp attention should be paid to measures aimed at 
widening the participation into the labour market. Many mature OECD economies have long begun to 
suffer from negative demographic pressures, in terms of ageing population and low participation rates, 
especially for female and young individuals. Particularly, failing to rapidly adapt pension and education 
systems - along with immigration policies - to the negative demographic trend might turn out to be very 
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costly in terms of income growth, even in presence of sustained productivity dynamics. Our results 
have also an additional insight for better-performing economies: given their relative success in 
improving labour market participation, the marginal benefit of productivity-enhancing policies in terms 
of GDP growth rates is higher since that contribution to income growth is not at risk of being offset by 
scarce performances on the extensive margin in the labour market.  
 In terms of theoretical modelling, our contribution indicates that, although our “forgotten factors” are 
not certainly new in growth theory (they are rather embedded in standard growth accounting), a 
specific effort should probably be made in terms of disentangling them in order to be properly 
accounted for in a more formal context. Even before the theoretical effort, more detailed econometric 
evidence is certainly needed. A further research step would have to deepen the analysis into the 
determinants of cross-country differences in our five factors. For example, a fully equipped panel 
econometric analysis could look at the role played by factors such as payroll taxation, the provision of 
childcare services and immigration patterns in economic growth dynamics through their effects on the 
five variables that we used in the present exercise. 
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Figures 
Figure 1: GDP and productivity growth 
GDP and productivity growth 1980-2005
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Source: WDI and OECD, own computations. 
Figure 2: per capita GDP growth, 1980-2005 
GDP growth 1980-2005
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Source: WDI, own computations. 
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Tables 
Table 1: panel unit root tests 
Variable LLC IPS H~ 
  
Individual 
intercept  
Ind. intercept 
and trend 
Individual 
intercept  
Ind. intercept 
and trend 
Individual 
intercept  
Ind. intercept 
and trend 
Y/N -1.117 1.643 4.731 -1.820 16.651 4.948 
 (0.132) (0.950) (1.000) (0.034)* (0.000)** (0.000)** 
D(Y/N) -8.8164 -7.18885 -9.56876 -7.227 0.19459 1.71427 
  (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.423) (0.043)* 
Y/H -2.379 0.901 3.831 2.776 17.105 7.986 
 (0.009)** (0.816) (0.999) (0.997) (0.000)** (0.000)** 
D(Y/H) -14.671 -14.482 -13.123 -12.586 2.308 7.015 
  (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.001)** (0.011)* (0.000)** 
~ Null hypothesis here is No Unit root; p-values in parenthesis 
*, ** significant at 5 and 1% respectively 
 
 
Table 2: Panel cointegration tests 
 Individual intercept Ind.intercept and trend 
Panel v 2.43** 
(0.007) 
1.61 
(0.052) 
Panel   1.40 
(0.919) 
3.69 
(0.991) 
Panel PP -1.20 
(0.113) 
-0.003 
(0.490) 
Group   2.79 
(0.990) 
4.74 
(1.000) 
Group t -1.28 
(0.09) 
0.29 
(0.614) 
        The null hypothesis here is No Cointegration; p-values in parenthesis 
         *, ** significant at 5 and 1% respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 20 
Table 3: Johansen cointegration test 
Country test null p-value 
Australia Max.eig. None 
At most 1 
0.003** 
0.598 
Belgium Max.eig. None 
At most 1 
0.004** 
0.586 
Canada Max.eig. None 
At most 1 
0.041* 
0.270 
Denmark Max.eig None 
At most 1 
0.009** 
0.932 
Finland Max eig. None 
At most 1 
0.000** 
0.736 
France Max.eig. None 
At most 1 
0.000** 
0.464 
Greece Max.eig. None 
At most 1 
0.222 
0.166 
Ireland Max.eig. None 
At most 1 
0.110 
0.450 
Italy Max eig. None 
At most 1 
0.125 
0.970 
Japan Max eig. None 
At most 1 
0.006** 
0.087 
Korea Max.eig. None 
At most 1 
0.006** 
0.532 
Netherlands Max. eig. None 
At most 1 
0.355 
0.622 
New Zealand Max. eig. None 
At most 1 
0.022* 
0.202 
Norway Max. eig. None 
At most 1 
0.059 
0.970 
Portugal Max eig. None 
At most 1 
0.105 
0.581 
Spain Max. eig. None 
At most 1 
0.086 
0.230 
Sweden Max.eig. None 
At most 1 
0.027* 
0.891 
UK Max.eig. None 
At most 1 
0.107 
0.719 
USA Max.eig. None 
At most 1 
0.002** 
0.544 
The null hypothesis are indicated by “None” and “At most 1 cointegrating relationship”. *, ** significant at 5 and 1% 
respectively. 
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Table 4: 25 year growth decomposition 
country / growth rates  /Y Ng   /Y Hg  /H Lg  /L LFg  /LF TAPg  /TAP Ng  
Korea 61.38% 58.46% -8.70% 0.68% 4.63% 6.31% 
Ireland 53.03% 42.40% -8.90% 5.27% 7.37% 6.87% 
Portugal 28.89% 26.24% -5.92% 0.62% 5.64% 2.30% 
Norway 26.01% 27.27% -4.63% -1.34% 2.92% 1.80% 
UK 25.31% 21.95% -1.72% 4.06% 0.62% 0.42% 
Spain 24.98% 20.13% -5.84% 0.92% 5.88% 3.89% 
Netherlands 22.95% 17.20% -6.84% 2.80% 11.05% -1.26% 
Finland 22.80% 28.23% -3.21% -1.72% 0.14% -0.65% 
USA 21.57% 18.48% -0.36% 0.93% 2.13% 0.40% 
Greece 21.21% 18.18% -2.32% -0.97% 4.32% 2.00% 
Japan 21.08% 26.54% -7.73% -1.08% 4.02% -0.67% 
Australia 20.95% 17.57% -1.64% 0.46% 3.08% 1.48% 
Belgium 20.55% 21.42% -6.02% 1.97% 3.89% -0.71% 
Denmark 20.48% 22.08% -1.13% -0.01% -1.36% 0.90% 
Sweden 19.27% 21.37% 2.51% -2.51% -2.93% 0.84% 
Canada 18.17% 15.20% -1.81% 0.33% 3.57% 0.87% 
Italy 17.03% 14.76% -0.95% -0.05% 2.14% 1.13% 
France 17.02% 26.15% -7.50% -1.75% -0.93% 1.04% 
New Zealand 12.87% 10.51% -0.75% 0.24% 1.96% 0.91% 
MEAN 25.03% 23.90% -3.87% 0.47% 3.06% 1.47% 
MEDIAN 21.21% 21.42% -3.21% 0.33% 3.08% 0.91% 
 
 
Table 5: relative weights in “good” and “bad” performers 
 
/Y Hm  /H Nm  /L LFm  /LF TAPm   /TAP Nm  
HIGH 91.40% -16.10% 4.08% 15.20% 5.42% 
TOTAL 97.19% -15.14% 0.99% 12.11% 4.85% 
LOW 104.26% -14.63% -1.48% 8.09% 3.76% 
 
Table 6: variance decomposition according to groups 
Country/variance 
/Y Hq  /H Nq  /N FLq  /FL TAPq  /TAP Nq  
HIGH 88.65% 3.54% 2.78% 4.28% 0.80% 
TOTAL 97.75% 4.59% 2.52% 4.04% 0.79% 
LOW 110.03% 5.94% 2.41% 3.50% 0.63% 
 
 
Table 7: convergence regressions 
 Y/N Y/H H/L L/LF LF/TAP TAP/N 
  coefficient -0.394** -0.298** -0.240* -0.561** -0.447** -0.664** 
Standard error 0.096 0.084 0.110 0.120 0.098 0.100 
t-statistic (-4.07) (-3.53) (-2.17) (-4.68) (-4.54) (-6.63) 
     *, ** significant at 5 and 1% respectively 
 
 
